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Abstract 
China has risen to the forefront of international scrutiny because of its unique 
political and economic structure and evolution.  The growth and development 
of China as a world economic power has resulted from the political-economic 
reform efforts of Communist leaders within China.  Under Mao Ze Dong, 
during the pre-socialistic modernization period, China began its reform of 
rehabilitation from war time and social-economic restructuring by instituting 
socialistic ideology.  During the Dengist period under Deng Xiao Ping, there 
was a transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy.  After Deng, 
socialist modernization reform has continued under China’s hybrid capitalistic 
economic model, with particularly significant effects on the rapidly structured 
financial market.  Entrenched with the within China’s hybrid capitalistic 
economic model are the politically and socially inextricable characteristics of 
which are based on generations of behavior.  Reform inefficiencies have 
resulted from state enterprises that lacked control, financial structure, and 
balance between state and private behavior.  The evolving capital market 
within China faced serious problems due to inefficiencies within state sector 
enterprises’ financial system.  Moreover, the banking system within China is 
inefficient and poorly organized.  Problematic issues such as financial 
institutions’ weak intermediary role, disorganization of financial assets, and 
unstable lending policy has been masked by the public’s trust in the state and 
political-social behavior of Chinese enterprises.  However, in order to 
transition China’s banking system to modern practice, bank intermediation, 
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capital asset balance, and foreign investment decontrol must be established.  
Creating a modern financial system in China will rely on reforming behavior 
as much, if not more than the reformation of policy.
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China’s Financial Institutions: Analysis of the Dynamic Changes and 
Associated Inefficiencies Under a Hybrid Capitalistic Approach 
 
Introduction 
The dynamic transformation and growth of China’s economy have 
triggered perplexing economic issues.  At the center of the economy control 
dilemmas is the matter of how to integrate changing social communist 
government philosophies with a dynamic capitalistic environment so as to 
promote the efficiency of China’s economic system.   
China has shown explosive economic growth, even after taking 
account of likely overstatements by Chinese national measurements. After 
economic stagnation under Mao's Great Leap Forward of the late-1950s and 
Cultural Revolution from the mid-'60s to the mid-'70s, China's growth rate for 
gross domestic product per capita averaged 5 percent per year in the 1980s 
and 8 percent in the 1990s (Barro, 2002).  This performance brought China 
from a per capita GDP of $700 in 1960 to the middle-income level of $4,300 
in 2001 (Barro, 2002).  As China’s economic presence has grown, concerns 
about the effect of the Chinese government’s political-economic actions on 
China’s economic system and its impacts in a globally expeditious world 
market have risen to the forefront of China’s economic development.   
Unlike many of its predecessors in economic reform, China has been a 
relatively reluctant reformist country, choosing to proceed cautiously and 
standing firm in face of foreign pressures to do otherwise.  China’s relative 
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insulation from world capital markets helped the country avoid economic 
depression during the Asian financial crisis in 1997, when Asian economic 
activity contracted, unemployment soared, bankruptcies were rampant, and 
poverty increased (United Nations, 1999).  From 1995 to 2001 China was able 
to establish a 7 percent per capita growth, while many of its neighbors 
suffered from the Asian financial crisis (Barro, 2002).  However, to promote 
longer-term growth, China will logically need to increase integration with 
global financial markets. 
Assessing China’s economic transitions reveal a badly fragmented 
economy laden with many state sector inefficiencies.  Two decades of 
uninterrupted market transformation and renewed determination to move 
ahead in market reform have made China’s economic potential more evident.  
Further reform on part of the government, industry, and financial system 
within China is needed in other to realize the full benefits of trade and 
investment liberalization.  In particular, this paper is an analysis of the 
inefficiencies of the financial institutions and its practices since the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 that has prevented it 
from realizing further market potential.   
 
Characteristics of Chinese Capitalism 
Chinese capitalism has been a revolution from traditionalistic 
capitalism, embedding itself within particular political and socio-economic 
contexts that can not be easily isolated.  Unlike American, German, or 
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Japanese genres of capitalism, China’s has been a gradualist approach instead 
of a direct push for capitalism, yet yielding unexpectedly swift results within 
three decades.   
Chinese hybrid capitalism has several key defining attributes.  One, 
Chinese capitalism is a particular social system of economic action and 
business activities that manifests itself through complex webs of family 
networks and personal relations.  “Guanxi,” a term directly translated into the 
word ‘relationship,’ has been used by many academia and professionals to 
describe the prevalent social factor in Chinese business.   
Chinese capitalism is organized and coordinated 
via neither market relations nor hierarchies of 
‘rational’ firms, but rather encompasses both 
markets and hierarchies to configure capitalist 
institutions through an informal system of social 
relationships and family obligations (Hamilton, 
2000, p.  56).   
Second, Chinese capitalism is not bound within specific territorial boundaries 
of nation-states.  Dominance of ethnic Chinese in many Asian territories such 
as Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia attest to the convoluted spread of Chinese 
capitalism around the world.  Through centuries of distinctive cultural 
practices and social organization, Chinese capitalism relies heavily on 
distinctive economic behavior and social action among ethnic Chinese.  
China, in essence is the base of Chinese cultural coherence and legitimacy.  
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Third, Chinese capitalism lacks dependence on state structures and policies, 
but relies on the key role of social actors rather than institutional structures in 
coordination with economic organization.  Much of this is a result of centuries 
of corruptive practices within governmental and organized institutions.  
Corruptive practices therein have reinforced the relational and personal 
networks in Chinese capitalism. 
 Acceptance into the WTO and acknowledgement of China’s economic 
potentials has placed China under scrutiny, particularly the culture of 
conducting business in China that differs quite strikingly from western 
counterparts.  Many critics have emphasized the importance of establishing 
institutional reform and regulatory statutes to stimulate behavioral change.  
However, cultural change will need more than regulatory proceedings to 
progress to the stage that some critics desire. 
 
Hybrid Capitalism Development Under Chinese Politics 
Chinese central government has employed a phased plan of 
progressively increasing market forces and eliminating areas of central 
planning.  Under the plan, separate channels for development outside the state 
sector, operating under different rules and conditions, have flourished.  Hybrid 
capitalism has two significances; one refers to the co-existence of state-owned 
and private enterprises, the other refers to the mode by which Chinese 
capitalism has transpired under cultural and ethnic influences.  Both 
conceptions are interrelated by the co-existence of complex social interactions 
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and institutional relationships among economic players.  China’s capitalistic 
development can be generally described as a phased process concurrent with 
the different political leadership of the central government.  
 
Socialist Modernization 
Japanese invasion, civil war, and the consequences of these actions 
had decimated the Chinese economy at the foundation of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949.   China’s economic growth during war time had 
declined sharply from previous peak levels of 9.4 percent to virtually zero 
growth (Lee, 1978).  Under the Communist leader Mao Ze Dong, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction through collectivization of agriculture, state 
control of industries, government organization of people’s communes, and 
industrial mobilization of economic activity were pushed rigorously (Lippit, 
1987).  Between the period of 1952 to 1978 and through an unintentional trial-
and-error process, Mao established a large state sector regime.  In an effort to 
collectivize agriculture and speed land reform, Mao established rural 
collectives and peoples communes.  These collective units were also part of 
Maoist efforts to decentralize state administration and weaken bureaucratic 
power (Lippit, 1987).  As a result, many private, household, sectors were 
brought under state control but controlled through local governing bodies.   
Mao’s vision for the new China incorporated traditional socialist 
values such as equality, solidarity, and social welfare.  Mao was, however, 
extremely critical of the personal material gain that drove capitalism, and 
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therefore resilient in disregarding foreign capitalistic ideology and foreign 
involvement.  Propaganda highlighting values of “serving the people” and 
“fight self” encourage those in authority to refrain from using their positions 
for personal benefit, and those out of it to stand up for social consciousness 
(Lippit, 2000).  These propaganda programs translated into some deformity of 
occupational concentration and purpose.  Intellectual workers ranging from 
teachers to bureaucrats were pressured to take long durations of retreats to 
rural areas and complete physical labor, having to divide their time of 
academic study and/or teaching with that of field work (Cheng, 2003).  Social 
pressures, moral appeals, and collective emphasis, particularly with the 
intertwinement of state and household industries during this period further 
entrenched the overlap of social relationships and political networks under 
economic environments (Riskin, 1987). 
 
Capitalistic Development & Reform  
Under Deng Xiao Ping, also known as the Dengist Period, the 
structural and ideology revolution began.  To fully lead China into social 
modernization meant a possible break from the very ideology and leadership 
of Mao.  Hailed as the founder of People’s Republic of China and author of its 
central body of doctrine, Mao was not only a prestigious leader, to many he 
was the very icon of modern China (Z. Zhou, personal interview, March 15, 
2005).  The entrenchment of politics into civilian ideology and living customs 
made reform and development difficult for “Dengists,” followers of Deng, to 
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reform.  Dismantlement of Maoist leadership and ideology needed to start 
with rooting out Maoist politics, policies, and institutions, then had to face the 
more challenging task of replacing old ideology with a new (Henderson, 
1999).  In order to stabilize Chinese politics, Deng and his followers 
dismissed harsh retaliation methods used previously by Maoists; rather Deng 
chose swift, decisive, and strategic change of leadership and reform within the 
communist party (Baum, 1994).  Deng managed the dilemma of Maoist de-
entrenchment with great sensitivity.  In 1981, he finally issued a major 
document criticizing Mao’s political ideas in relation to the Cultural 
Revolution, one of the programs during Mao’s leadership that had met with 
overwhelming social failures (Blecher, 2000).  It was a refreshing change 
from the Manichaean approach to problems that had stifled serious debate of 
Deng’s predecessors.   
Chinese economy relied heavily on its land resources and was largely 
concentrated in agriculture and natural industries consisting of steel, coal, 
electric power, and cement (World Bank, 1995).  During the Deng period, 
rural reform span spontaneously toward contractual relationships; a form of 
bartering that traded land or items in return for a payment in cash or kind 
(Blecher, 2000).  The agricultural “household responsibility system,” which 
were originally collectivistic programs holding households and respective 
communes responsible for certain agricultural goals, grew increasingly 
comprehensive and individualistic (Baum, 2000).  Swift pace of rural 
institutional reform and some removal of entry barriers also spurred the 
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increase of a new class of entrepreneurs in non-agricultural venues that helped 
develop China’s prospective market-based economy (OECD, 2002).  Under 
Deng, enterprises were given more autonomy; enterprises were permitted to 
make own decisions regarding above-quota output, and to negotiate selling 
prices (Blecher, 2000).  Rapid institutional and economic changes, however, 
did not warrant a complete transformation of the basic political ideology and 
institutional features of the Chinese political system and leaders.   
Reform’s mixed results during the latter periods under Deng stirred 
debate internally within the party and within the intellectual community.  
During the late 1980s, there were an increase number of small private 
merchants competing against state enterprises, depletion of foreign exchange 
reserves, rise of corruption, and inflation; but also showcased record foreign 
trade volumes, growing influx of foreign investments, and declining poverty 
(Barale, 1989).  Infamously known as “6-4” amongst the Chinese community, 
the Tiananmen Square incident on June 4, 1989 and similar student reform 
movements was the concurrent result from the period’s high economic growth 
rate, crystallization of the political and economic systems’ boundaries, and 
emergence of reformist optimistic and proactive opinion (Barale, 1989).  
Fearful that inflation, crime, and intensifying tensions would destabilize and 
destroy the economy, party leaders decided to take forceful measures to 
maintain social and political stability.  Chinese leaders were not ready to 
relinquish institutional ideology and political structure.  These decisions 
garnered much criticism, particularly under the media politics of the 1989 
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student movement, portraying the government as a corruptive, unreasonable, 
and authoritarian force suppressive of the masses.  During the progress of 
student protests, organization of unofficial trade unions formed within diverse 
industries; and more increasingly under direct partnership with intellectuals 
(Henderson, 1999).  Socio-economic change had advanced more rapidly than 
political and institutional change.  Dengists emerged from the late 80s 
political-economic crises by enforcing stricter economic policy; slowing down 
growth to tame inflation, and circumscription of the market (Blecher, 2000).  
Tightened credit and fiscal policies served to curtail industrial investment, 
while rural industries were closed or restricted by credit, tax, and regulatory 
polices (Lardy, 1998).  Heightened opinions, economic uncertainty, and fear 
of losing control of civil society led the Dengist government to follow strict 
restrictions on civil liberties in addition to their monopolistic rule of economic 
transformation. 
 
Structural Development of China’s Hybrid System 
The reform years under Deng had created a combination of market 
forces, state and collective ownership, entrepreneurialism, as well as 
heightened tensions.  Previously, China lacked the legal, institutional, and 
governance structures needed to support an economic system based 
predominantly on private ownership.  However, with government’s reform 
efforts and growth of individualistic behavior, and increasingly structures to 
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accommodate such behavior, growth of private and market entities have 
increased dramatically.  
 
Privatization 
Privatization of state-managed enterprises is a strategy to restructure 
China’s economy and give empowerment to local governments in 
relinquishing unprofitable and/or small state and collective enterprises.  
Privatization has been crucial in restructuring.  Chinese central authorities 
chose a method of selling state shares, particularly to employees of state-
owned enterprises, rather than free distribution of shares (OECD, 2002).  The 
strategy was carefully implemented through staged applications, with the first 
large scale piloting in Zhucheng in 1994, a small city in Shangdong province 
that generated comprehensive media coverage (Henderson, 1999).  In 1997, 
the Chinese government extended this practice to all the cities in China 
(OECD, 2002).  Between 1993 and 1998, Guanxi province reformed 15 
percent of the total number of state-managed enterprises in Guanxi, an 
example of the effectiveness of the program in smaller regions (Chinese 
Financial Annual, 1998).   
State-managed and owned enterprises were transformed in various 
forms, including changing into joint stock companies that the state remained 
the largest shareholder, or sold to employees in a framework of the co-
operated shareholding system (OECD, 2002).  Less frequently, wholly capital 
privatization occurred, usually with financially unstable companies, which 
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were auctioned off at centers for the sale and exchange of state assets (OECD, 
2002). Most of the state-managed companies that remained were in certain 
high technology or raw resources industries that were considered strategic at 
the national level (Lardy, 1998). 
 
Fragmentation  
Fragmentation of wholly and partially state-owned enterprises is very 
prevalent in China. The practice of locally autonomous enterprises, in addition 
to large state production units initiated under the Maoist period, has continued 
to exist.  Thus, not only does each ministry under the Chinese central 
government have its own enterprises, but each province, and sometimes each 
municipality have its own production systems (OECD, 2002).  Large 
percentage of these state-owned and joint-state enterprises is kept under 
regional control and under diverse governing bodies; thereby making up a 
highly fragmented industry structure.   
Chinese private enterprises are fragmented by competition and 
competitors more so than by goods and services produced, due to Chinese 
businesses’ proliferation practices and government’s pressure to acquire 
diverse loss-making state companies by capable private businesses (Lardy, 
1998).  Private enterprises remain highly localized, though several have 
established nationally and internationally through strong management and 
ability to negotiate with the state and respective governing bodies (“The 
struggle of the champions,” 2005).   
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Industry Inefficiencies 
The 1990s provided reform opportunities with its continued expansion 
and economic growth, as well as shifting emphasis to private enterprises.  
However, massive economic problems of declining arable land, 
unemployment, growing gap between rich and poor, and inflation related 
directly to the shifting of state-owned enterprises to non-state firms (Benewick 
& Wingrove, 1995).  In general, Chinese industry is laden by two problems: 
low pace of consolidation in the different sectors and the slow exit from the 
market of inefficient producers.  Increased burdens of responsibilities and lack 
of appropriate resources were the primarily causes of the failure of many 
state-owned enterprises (Lardy, 1994).   
State-owned enterprises were obligated to provide broad range of 
social services, which should have been financed from the government budget 
instead of from individual enterprises, and employ certain number of workers 
to meet government’s political agenda of maintaining low levels of 
unemployment.  Between 1978 and 1994, employment in state-owned firms 
increased by 40 million (Lardy, 1998).  Forced to stabilize employment rate, 
and absorb a disproportionately large share of investment resources, which 
were largely misallocated, many state-owned firms were driven into 
bankruptcy.  For these reasons and continued government pressure, financial 
performance declined and many state firms, inclusive of state-owned financial 
institutions, and were unable to service debt borrowed.   
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Being highly fragmented, China’s industry sector lacked an 
appropriate level of consolidation and standardization.  As a means of solving 
this problem as well as the issue of loss-incurring enterprises, the central 
government increasing privatized state-owned firms and eased bankruptcy 
laws to eliminate unproductive enterprises.  
 
Financial System’s Influence on China’s Hybrid Capitalism 
A large contributing factor to China’s hybrid capitalism has been the 
financial system, which has both sustaining and constricting influences on the 
liberalization of China’s economy.  The banking system in China has been 
prevailing as the central government’s institutional tool in sustaining reform 
strategies implemented for China’s economic development.  Assessing 
China’s economic transitions reveal decades of state-owned banks having 
channeled civilian savings into unreformed, money losing enterprises, 
resulting in a dramatic rise of debt in state-related organizations.  The 
predominate reason why strengthening China’s financial institutions’ weak 
and frequently inability to exercise appropriate control and prudential 
supervision of lower branches has been difficult is because of the tight and 
conflicting central government oversight on these financial institutions. 
 
China’s Banking System 
Role of financial institutions. 
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Financial institutions, as an intermediary between depositors and 
borrowers, serve multiple roles.  First, banks provide efficient mechanisms for 
pooling of funds from small depositors, obviating the need for firms to raise 
funds directly from large number of lenders.  Second, financial institutions 
function in a way to alleviate time span inconsistencies between lenders and 
borrowers.  Banks can meet short-term withdrawals from other depositors due 
to the large number of clients they serve.  Third, lending to broad range of 
projects diversifies risk better than if individual depositors were to invest 
themselves.  Fourth, financial institutions accumulate valuable skills and 
experience in evaluating investment projects in differentiated markets.  
Finally, financial institutions provide discipline and enforcement mechanisms 
by ensuring that quality borrowers are provided with lower cost of funds, and 
low quality borrowers are monitored and enforced to amortize their loans 
(Brealey, Myers, & Marcus, 2004)).  In a fully conceptualized capital market, 
both financial institutions and capital market can perform intermediary and 
disciplinary functions.  However, China’s financial intermediaries had not yet 
evolved to such stages.  
 
Pre-reform banking system and early reform. 
Pre-reform China had no capital markets and banks did not serve as 
intermediaries for two reasons.  One, the source of bank deposits in 
developing market economies, household savings, was extremely small.  The 
Chinese national savings were mobilized almost entirely within the 
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government sector, which were derived from profits of state-owned 
enterprises (Lardy, 1994).  Second, investment was financed predominantly 
from interest-free budgetary grants, and to a lesser degree from the retained 
profits of enterprises (Lardy, 1998).  The budget, county and lower-level 
governments were all sources of working capital of state-owned enterprises, 
and therefore circumscribed the intermediary and disciplinary role of banks 
(Jefferson & Singh, 1999).  At the time of financial sector reform, China had 
only a simple institutional structure consisting of a few banks and a network 
of rural credit cooperatives, a form of informal financial institution tied 
together by townships (United Nations, 1999).  The People’s Bank of China, 
PBoC, simultaneously served as China’s central bank, regulating money 
supply, fixing interest rates, managing the state’s holdings of foreign 
exchange, and supervising and controlling all other financial institutions 
(People’s Bank of China, 2005).  In essence, China had a mono-bank system, 
which operated as the central governmental and sole commercial bank.  
Unlike many developed financial systems, China’s central bank, PBoC, is not 
an independent body; rather it is a ministry under the State Council of China 
(Standard Chartered, 2001).  By construction, it shares policy making power 
with other ministries under the central government, if not directly subjected to 
mandates of the State Council (OECD, 2002). 
 
Banking reform: late 1970s to 1990s. 
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 China’s financial system grew more complex as reform underwent, 
with new array of banks and non-bank financial institutions.  Initially, new 
non-bank financial institutions competed very limitedly because of small 
capital and centrally set interest rates.  Having no mandatory burden of 
financing state-owned enterprises, the new institutions had stronger financial 
position and more efficient intermediation between depositors and borrowers.  
Consequently, these institutions grew.  During the late 70s through the 80s, 
the Chinese government elevated subordinate banks under the People’s Bank 
of China, and distinguished the banks from one another (Lardy, 1994).  At the 
same time, banks were authorized broader business scope, including the sale 
of bonds on international markets (Huang, 1999).  Explanations for such 
institutional changes revert to China’s increasing participation in international 
economy, particularly its entry into the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund in 1980 (OECD, 2002).  In December 1981, China Investment 
Bank, CIB, was created to serve as the institution to control disbursement of 
project funds provided to China by the World Bank, and later on for the Asian 
Development Bank in 1986 (OECD, 2002).  Disbursement power of the CIB 
included foreign currency loans to finance rising imports of technology and 
capital goods; and domestic currency loans to finance local counterpart 
component of foreign-funded projects.   
Beginning in mid-1980s, the People’s Bank of China became 
responsible for issuing currency, managing credit, setting interest rates, and 
supervising China’s foreign exchange business; signifying its growing role 
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(Lardy, 1998).  Comprehensive business scope of the four major specialized 
banks gave other rising financial institutions little opportunity; thus the four 
specialized banks faced few competition.  To increase competition, the State 
Administration of Exchange Control gradually approved increasing numbers 
of branches of specialized banks to enter foreign exchange business (Huang, 
1996).  At the end of 1994, the central bank allowed for fourteen new banks to 
establish limited branches, sub-branches, and organizational structures below 
the sub-branch level (Lardy, 1998).  Despite these allowances, the four major 
banks have continued to dominate in the provision of financial services due to 
the limited geographic mobility of the Chinese public and the limited 
geographic location of the new banks.  
China’s modern banking system is divided into three segments: four 
major state-owned commercial banks, twelve joint stock banks, and city 
commercial banks [see Table 1.1].  In 1994, “policy banks” were created to 
take over non-commercial lending previously carried out by the commercial 
banks (“China and the WTO: perspective on a changing environment,” 2005).  
Policy banks function similar to development banks but have diversified into 
more traditional commercial banking activities, specifically in public sector 
loan services.  Additionally, China has a postal savings bank, which takes 
deposits but does not make commercial loans, along with a large network of 
urban and rural credit co-operatives (OECD, 2002).  Credit co-operatives 
networked across the country provides services similar to commercial banks, 
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though many are not consider formal commercial banks under the current 
regulatory framework. 
Table 1.1 
 
Source: Standard Chartered, April 2001 
http://www.tdctrade.com/econforum/sc/sc010402.htm 
 
Renminbi & the Currency System 
 Renminbi development. 
Renminbi’s issuance dates prior to the establishment of People’ 
Republic of China in 1949.  To unify and establish consistency of the currency 
usage throughout China, the Government Administration Council of Central 
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People’s Government called in currency issuances by the Northeast Bank and 
People’s Bank of Inner Mongolia, as well as unified the Xin Jiang bank note 
(Yeung, 2004).  China’s existing exchange rate is a floating rate system that is 
dictated by bank’s purchases and sale system (OECD, 2002).  The Renminbi 
was informally pegged against the dollar in 1994.  It pegged the Renminbi to 
the US dollar at around 8.3 Renminbi for every US dollar, allowing the rate to 
float between designated ranges. The Chinese government firmly maintained 
its exchange rate after the breakout of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, 
which made southeastern Asian nations devalue their currencies one-by-one  
(China Internet Information Center, 2003). 
 
Currency system reform. 
Reform of the late 1970s included the reform of the Renminbi 
currency through the issuance of foreign exchange certificate, FEC, to 
represent a partially convertible currency for foreign use (Brahm, 1996, p.  
120).  This dual track currency system designated Renminbi-use to domestic 
parties, while foreigners were forced to use foreign exchange certificates.  The 
usage was more specifically toward rationing consumer commodities, 
particularly imports; consequently it provided avoidance of unnecessary drain 
and leakage of China’s minimal foreign exchange reserves (Henderson, 1999).  
During the 1980s, China’s growth economically indicated increased needs for 
raw materials and technology imports.  With the expansion of the domestic 
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consumer market, the FEC became an institutionalized section of the 
regulatory mechanism, until it was abolished in 1993 (Zhang, 1999). 
 Prior to the Asian Crisis, reform of the currency system involved the 
Renminbi being staged at artificially high levels by the government.  At the 
onset of the Asian Crisis, financial trading system was liberalized to 
incorporate two exchange rates, the official rate and the “internal settlement 
rate” that was executed between the People’s Bank of China and China’s 
foreign trading companies (Henderson, 1999, p.  86).  Criticisms of China’s 
two exchange rates were largely based on the allegation that the official 
Renminbi rate was overvalued against the dollar as a protective measure to let 
domestic trading companies obtain competitive leverage over foreign trading 
partners.  The dramatic increase of consumerism in the 1980s, generated a 
trade balance in favor of imports, drained foreign exchange reserves.  
Following the import increases, the government devalued the Renminbi in 
attempts to higher export and increases the cost of imports (Lardy, 1998).  
Regulations to sustain balance coincided with a drop of internal settlement 
rate of the black market for foreign exchange, a large influencer in the early 
financial reform periods.  During the mid-1980s, State Administration of 
Exchange Control, SAEC, was delegated the task of setting up limited number 
of foreign exchange adjustment centers, also known as “swap centers,” where 
foreign trade investors could trade foreign exchange and Renminbi at rates 
between designated parameters (Wang, n.d.).  To stabilize the exchange rate, 
the swap center rates began to shift closer to black market rates, further 
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devaluing the Renminbi.  State investment was additionally promoted for 
export industries in a measure to increase exports.  In 1994, China Foreign 
Exchange Trading System based in Shanghai, gradually replaced swap centers 
(Henderson, 1999).   
China’s reformist economy had let it survive the Asian financial crises 
of the later 1990s, and generate much international attention and diplomatic 
importance in its ability to stabilize its financial market.  Despite the Asian 
crisis in 1997 that showed the devaluation of Asian currency, China and the 
Chinese government were able to maintain level constancy of the Renminbi.  
China was able to avoid large financial distress faced by Asian counterparts 
partly because of insulation of account surpluses, capital account controls, and 
large foreign exchange reserves (Huang, 2002).  Maintaining the value of the 
Renminbi was politically and economically employed as a tool to increase 
China’s image of international responsibility and economic stability.  China’s 
relatively stable currency value in comparison to flailing Asian economies 
allowed China to gain valuable export market share over its Asian 
counterparts.  To fully leverage this opportunity, the Chinese government 
additionally released orders to state banks to financial support state-owned 
enterprises and to focus on exports.  In 1998, China cut interest rates three 
times to reduce domestic costs for exporter operations, another strategy to 
increase domestic export (Hamilton, 2000).   
 Since 1995, the Chinese government has held and continues to hold 
the Renminbi at approximately $8.28 against the dollar, and shows no 
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inclination to adjust the pegging policy in the near future (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2005).  Strategically, China has established competencies in pegging 
the Renminbi against the U.S. dollar, and is unlikely to risk destabilizing the 
current economic role of the Renminbi, though consistent pressures from 
foreign countries, particularly the U.S., has been put on the central 
government (Blustein, 2005). 
 
Financial Institutions’ Challenges 
Domestic bank’s competitiveness faces several problems; amongst 
them are the low profitability, poor asset quality from high non-performing 
loans together with inadequate capital, and impaired ability to control loan 
quality (OECD, 2002).  These problems are partly due to accumulated 
burdens arising from past inefficiencies, and ongoing weaknesses in 
governance and operating capabilities.  The lack of freedom and complex 
hierarchical procedural issues that coincides with close government 
coordination is also a hindrance.  These issues also undermine the 
effectiveness with which banks are able to allocate credit and to exercise 
financial discipline over enterprises, posing potential risks to financial 
stability.   
 
Financial Institutions as a Reform Tool 
Only 0.6 percent of the total number of enterprises created between 
1988 and 1996 has been put into bankruptcy despite continuously poor 
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financial results, which signified the government’s allowance for low 
mortality rate of these companies (OECD, 2002).  In addition, there exists a 
strong anti-creditor prejudice, especially against banks, despite provision in 
the bankruptcy law that give creditors a priority on the remaining assets 
(Lardy, 1998).  Usually, remaining assets are only enough to cover employee 
rehabilitation expenses, which in turn infers that the rate of recovery on initial 
loans by domestic banks is extremely low. 
Three interrelated problems emerged out of the early banking reform 
systems to constrict development of financial institutions within China 
because of its use by the government as a complementary tool for industry 
reform.  First, firms increasingly borrowed to finance purchase of new 
equipment, productive assets, production inputs, wage costs, and social 
services for their employees, at times even to meet pension and tax obligations 
(Yeung, 2004).  Indebtedness far exceeded the assets of state-owned firms.  
State-owned enterprises built up large unfunded pension liabilities, unpaid tax 
liabilities, and inter-enterprise debts, which are triangular debts partly within 
the state-owned enterprise sector (Lardy, 1998).  The government assumed the 
burden of subsidizing growing losses through fiscal subsidies and “policy 
loans,” which were loans taken from the state-owned banking system (Lardy, 
1998).  Financial institutions were in essence a form of budgetary fund for 
state-related operations and enterprises.  The early 1990s absorbed 10 percent 
or more of gross domestic product each year for these direct and indirect 
subsidies (World Bank, 1995).  The strategy of preventing the emergence of 
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economic failures was accomplished largely by deferring industrial 
restructuring, a process financed by the buildup of huge financial liability on 
the part of state-owned firms (Jefferson & Singh, 1999).  Consequently, state-
owned firms are predisposed to become insolvent.  Second, state-owned banks 
and financial institutions extended loans without consideration of financial 
deepening.  In a market economy, an increase of the size of the financial 
sector, as measure by assets, which in China’s case are largely loans, relative 
to real output can indicate financial deepening (Brealey, & et. al., 2004).  
Given the large percentage of nonperforming loans, and China’s ratio of 
money to gross domestic product was over 100 percent in 1996, a crisis will 
occur should money in savings accounts decrease and banks lose their 
liquidity (State Statistical Bureau, 1997).  Third, decreasing government 
revenues between 1978, at 31.2 percent, and 1995, at 10.7 percent, signified 
that the state was increasingly unable to finance normal governmental 
expenditures from state budget (State Statistical Bureau, 1996).  Financial 
institutions limited reserves would go to fund state expenditures when a need 
arise.  
After 1993, the Chinese government realized the high amount non-
performing loans, NPLs, to which the People’s Bank of China reacted by 
significantly reducing both its subsidies to state-owned enterprises and its 
loans to commercial banks (Lardy, 1998).  According to the OECD (2002), 
subsidies to the state-owned enterprises were reduced from 7.5 percent of 
GDP in 1992 to 2.3 percent in 1994, and to less than 1 percent after 1995.  
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From 1994 to 1998, loans from the People’s Bank of China to state 
commercial banks grew at an average annual rate of 6 percent as opposed to 
20 percent before 1994 (Chinese Financial Annual, 1998).  The government’s 
subsequent decision to turn the big four state banks into commercial banks 
and cleanse balance sheets made the banks more conservative, due the fact 
that bad loans were now less likely to be financed by new loans from  the 
People’s Bank of China (OECD, 2002). 
These initial steps were followed by a series of reforms to the evolving 
banking system.  The Chinese government required the four state commercial 
banks to increase their profits and “clean up balance sheets” by restricting bad 
debt (De Brower, & Pupphavesa, 1998).  With new contexts and restrictions, 
the four state banks were increasingly unwilling to lend money to companies 
that were heavily in debt.  During the course of 1997, over two thousand large 
and medium sized Shanghai state companies were audited and ranked 
according to their financial situation; to which they were then issued “loan 
certificates” summarizing their credit track record, allowing for proof of 
documentation when making new credit requests to banks (De Brower, & 
Pupphavesa, 1998).  These initial reforms helped to stabilize the previously 
heavily indebted and high non-performing loaning during the Asian crisis.  
 
Public sector impacts. 
Public sector is essential during the macroeconomic fluctuations of the 
economy, particularly when a deficit, or low borrowing level, occurs.  
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Problems of the budget deficit can be alleviated by the sale of treasury bonds, 
but the broader problem of public sector deficit being at unsustainable level 
over gross domestic output have multiple implications (Stoll, 1998).  China’s 
high public sector deficit reduces the flow of savings available to finance non-
state investment, leading them to rely on informal credit markets, 
reinvestment of profits, and closely allied state-owned firms for financing 
(Jefferson & Singh, 1999).  State-owned enterprises, however, refrain from 
extending excessive indirect credit in case they create new competition in 
their core businesses; contributing to the problem of insufficient resources for 
the public sector.  The need to sustain loss-making state-owned enterprises 
influences bank lending by limiting the ability to vary interest rates to reflect 
risk, which implies that cost of credit varies widely among borrowers of 
comparable credit worthiness.   
 Due to the non-recoverable borrowing by state firms, the public sector 
deficit accumulated over time, reducing the net worth of government assets 
below the optimum level of efficient economies.  Under such premises, as the 
government debt rises above share of output, investors will lose confidence in 
the ability of the government to finance its expenditures on a non-inflationary 
basis and will demand higher interest to compensate for the anticipated 
increase in inflation.  The unpredictability and lack of guarantee in a 
commercial environment had prevented Chinese banks to operate fully on 
commercial terms until borrowing behavior fundamentally changes. 
 
         INEFFICIENCIES OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM  27   
  
 
Banking profitability. 
Chinese banks’ profitability has declined steadily; in 1999, reported 
profits before tax of the four largest state-owned central banks ranged between 
slightly negative as a ratio of total assets to 0.33 percent (OECD, 2002).  The 
Bank of China lost monopolistic offering of deposits and loans denominated 
in foreign currencies and settlement of foreign trade transactions, and other 
types of foreign exchange business; falling to two-fifths of the banks’ share of 
the market in foreign trade settlement (Lardy, 1998).   
Reported profits are also a poor measurement tool because of habitual 
practices in overstating profits.  This includes sub-par practices in accounting 
for the accrual of interest on loans, which are below international standards.  
Profit figures are also overstated by relatively low charges for loan provisions, 
meaning that banks are allowed to set aside only 1 percent of total loans as 
provisions.  Under international standards, 1 percent is low, and particularly 
unrealistic given the indebted financial condition of China’s banks.  Another 
overstating profits practice is that Chinese banks are allowed to take very 
limited write-offs on bad loans (“China and the WTO: perspective on a 
changing environment,” 2005).  
Low level of profits is also attributed to inefficiencies that lead to 
excessively high costs in bank operations.  Extensive branching of small and 
poorly located offices, with occasional overstaffing makes it economically 
costly (Yeung, 2004).  Bank costs are further inflated by the relatively high 
turnover tax rate imposed on bank loans; prior to 2001 it was at 8 percent, to 
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which lowered to 7 percent in 2001 (OECD, 2002).  A last major influential 
factor to low profitability is the use of low or outdated technology, which 
further contributes to relatively low productivity in bank operations at the 
branches.  
 
Credit policy reform. 
After initial steps at reform, and the Asian crisis, the Chinese 
government put much emphasis in stabilizing the already fine balance 
between credit and savings.  Bank loans to state-owned and public sector were 
given out sparingly in order to reduce the social costs of transition; waiting for 
companies to be privatized, merged, or put into bankruptcy.  Bank lending, 
which was growing at an annual pace of more than 20 percent in the summer 
of 2004, has diminished to 10 percent in March of 2005 (“Finance and 
economics,” 2005).   
Non-performing loans of banks have inflated national public loans; 
another inefficiency of the financial system that has not been solved.  In the 
late 1990s, OECD estimated approximately 50 percent or more of the total 
loans of state-owned central banks are national public loans (2002).  China’s 
banks have low levels of capital to cushion against national public loans, low 
profitability, and high national public loans; consummating into a decreased 
ability of Chinese banks to compete against increasing foreign competition.  
Financial weaknesses of the banks directly limit the capacity of institutions to 
invest in improvements in their capabilities, to raise funds in domestic or 
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foreign financial markets, and to form alliances with foreign banks.  These 
conditions tend to also weaken internal incentives to asses and monitor credit 
risks. 
Since the inception of new banking law in 1996, authorities have taken 
several initiatives to improve bank-lending standards (Chan & Rotenberg, 
1999).  Direct quotas on bank lending were abolished and replaced with 
required ratios of assets to liabilities and asset liability system to regulate 
aggregate credit.  Banks were required to establish a strict separation between 
loan origination and loan approval, something previously foreign in practice 
and the source of many fraudulent practices.  The government has 
strengthened the accountability by making higher-level bank offices 
responsible for lower branch’s compliance with lending standards, and by 
making lending officers and their senior management accountable for new bad 
loans (Yeung, 2004).  These measures reinforced earlier policy banks creation 
to take responsibility over government directed or other preferential lending, 
previously carried out by the commercial banks.  Such reforms have 
substantially reduced obvious government direction of credit, and have 
significantly improved lending standards and credit quality.  Though, non-
commercial consideration continue to influence lending decisions to a lesser 
degree and through more indirect channels, state-owned central banks were 
allocated minimum quotas for matching lending to infrastructure projects 
financed by the government’s special bond issues in 1998 (Yeung, 2004).  
Continued operation of numerous loss-producing state-owned enterprises 
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unable to service loans suggests that banks continue to provide working 
capital to firms that would not meet basic standards of creditworthiness.  
Government allowance for such enterprises should decrease in order to 
improve market efficiency of the financial system. 
 
Asset management & equity. 
 In 1998, the central government launched a program of recapitalization 
of the four biggest state commercial banks, which has helped the biggest state-
owned enterprises to reduce their debt.  The program allowed banks to write-
off from the balance sheet certain non-performing loans made to state-owned 
enterprises.  Corresponding loans to the state-owned enterprises were taken 
over by four liquidating companies created for the purpose; China Cinda, 
China Huarong, China Great Wall Asset, and China Oriental (OECD, 2002).  
The liquidating, or asset management, companies take over assets and are 
responsible for selling the assets.  The difference between the initial value of 
the asset and the amount recovered is that the recovery or asset sale is 
financed, if properly implemented, by state bonds (Brealey, & et. al., 2004).  
 Since 2002, the program has contributed to a substantial reduction of 
the debt of the largest state-owned enterprises, and has boosted the 
profitability of the public sector (“SASAC sets deadline for debt-to-equity 
swap”, 2005).  It represents initiative steps towards resolving the structural 
problem that links state-owned enterprises investment performance and the 
evolution of state commercial bank lending practices.  Asset management 
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companies have not concentrated on new loans but have concentrated on old 
loans that are difficult to recover, giving state commercial banks leeway in 
efforts on reforming credit lending practices on the new loans made since the 
mid-1990s, as well as cleansing portfolios of non-performing investments.  
The Chinese government has made clear indications of letting asset 
management companies actively play a supervisory role and focus on debt 
resolution and restructuring of state-owned enterprises.  Asset management 
companies are entitled to trade assets among themselves to become larger 
creditors and concentrate their effort on more limited number of enterprises 
(OECD, 2002). 
 Asset management companies, however face several challenges.  Most 
asset management companies entering boards of major state-owned 
enterprises are unable to maximize their influence and control the actions of 
the managers, and/or to censure them for several reasons.  Firstly, there is an 
asymmetry of information provided to the different parties.  The lack of 
transparency in the accounting system and poor functioning of board of 
directors allows state-owned managers to continue to control access to 
strategic information on firms.  Secondly, there is a large number of 
companies under the program, resulting in the handling to billions of 
Renminbi assets, and tens of thousands of debtor companies.  Overload of 
duties and responsibilities disperses concentration of the asset management 
companies.  A third corresponding deterrent is that asset management 
companies lack sufficient supply of human resources and skills to play a 
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strategic role in state-owned enterprises governance; including financial 
management and technology skills.  Lastly, according to statutes that created 
asset management companies, they lack effective shareholder power, and are 
subject to negotiation with the central and local bureaucracies in charge of 
large state-owned enterprises, and thereby undercutting their power to force 
restructuring of the state-owned enterprises.  China Huarong and China Cinda, 
some of the more notable asset management companies have difficulty 
dealing with strong conglomerates such as Monkey King Group and 
Zhengzhou Baiwen in restructuring plans.  Both state-owned enterprises tried 
to escape control of asset management companies by either petitioning for 
bankruptcy to resist restructuring plans or committing actions to resist 
bankruptcy procedures and shutdown (World Bank, 2000).  
 
Improving competitiveness & foreign bank involvement. 
As evidenced by the relatively low rates of capacity utilization in 
many branches of Chinese industry in the mid-1990s, lack of competition 
from non-state sector to encourage production contributes to the lagging 
economic performance of many state-owned firms (Lardy, 1998).  Previously, 
foreign banks assets were insignificantly small compared with assets of 
domestic financial institutions.  In conjunction with protecting domestic firms, 
role of foreign financial institutions in China is limited because of the 
constraint on services permitted and geographic areas these foreign banks are 
licensed to operate. 
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The Chinese government in the 1990s acted on initiatives of reforming 
the domestic currency business, marking a step toward giving foreign banks 
the awaited right to take Renminbi deposits and make Renminbi-denominated 
loans (Lardy, 1998).  To assure domestic risk is minimized, the Chinese 
government set strict restrictions on foreign banks.  Firstly, foreign banks may 
carry out business dealings only with Chinese firms that are joint-venturing or 
have foreign-related business operations (Benewick, & et. al., 1995).  This 
proved to be problematic for foreign banks due to the small number of 
foreign-related Chinese firms at the time.  In addition, this limitation made it 
difficult to establish ties with those firms that were not already expanding ties 
to foreign business.  Secondly, foreign banks are limited in providing full 
services of the domestic currency business.  A stake in the profitable credit 
card business was not available for foreign banks.  Thirdly, foreign banks 
must relinquish right to preferential tax rate, to which was a capital and 
opportunity loss for foreign banks (Brahm, 1996).  Finally, to prevent 
unnecessary integration and protection of domestic money market, the 
Chinese government limited the number of joint and foreign banks authorized 
to conduct Renminbi businesses (Lardy, 1998).   
Prior to large financial reform of the 1990s, foreign banks faced strict 
policy, geographical, and customer limitations, which were designed to 
protect state commercial banks from foreign competition.  In 1999, foreign 
banks accounted for only approximately 2 percent of the total bank assets in 
China (OECD, 2002).  Following China’s WTO commitments, several key 
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restrictions on foreign bank operations will be phased out within a five year 
plan.  In late 2004, China Banking Regulatory Commission, CBRC, 
announced steps to improve foreign banks’ access in China’s domestic 
market, primarily by offering Renminbi-denominated banking services in 
Beijing, Kunming, Xiamen, Ningbo, Shenyang, Shantou, and Xian 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004).   
Also according to China’s WTO agreements, the country must allow 
foreign banks to issue Renminbi-denominated credit cards by 2007, to which 
the Chinese government seems active in abiding (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2002a).  After accession into the WTO, China has allowed foreign banks to 
issue credit cards domestically, giving the right for foreign banks to do full-
service banking for Chinese companies (Areddy, 2004).  Foreign banks are 
able to offer foreign currency-denominated credit cards to Chinese civilians 
with foreign currency-denominated salaries.  And already foreign banks are 
taking advantage of the opportunity to expand presence in China.  In 
September, Canada's Bank of Nova Scotia secured regulatory approval to 
increase its stake in Xian City Commercial Bank to 12.5 percent (“China 
finance,” 2005).  In November, Commonwealth Bank of Australia announced 
it had reached an agreement to buy 11 percent of Jinan City Commercial 
Bank, China's eighth-largest city commercial bank, and with the option to 
increase to 20 percent ownership (“China finance,” 2005).  Foreign banks 
have competitive advantages in many areas: good asset quality, superior skills 
and technology, international expertise, overseas networks and access to 
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diverse global markets, flexible management structures, and good risk control 
and assessment.  However, foreign banks lack a substantial comparative 
advantage with China; the ability to establish networks with domestic 
enterprises and customers.  CBRC stated that by the end of 2006, all 
geographical restrictions on local currency banking will be removed 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004).   
 
Creating a Modern Financial System Up to International Standards 
China’s banking system has undergone significant changes in the last 
two decades.  In the course of its transformation from a mono-bank system 
typical of centrally-planned economies, to an increasingly diversified, multi-
layered system comprising of central bank and growing number of domestic 
and foreign commercial banks, China’s banking system is now among the 
world’s largest, particularly in relation to gross domestic product, GDP 
(OECD, 2002).  Parts of the banking system are comparable in the 
sophistication and market orientation to those found in other emerging 
economies and the banking system is rapidly modernizing further, while some 
parts are still heavily influenced by past centralized system. 
 
Lending Policy 
After decades of extending loans largely at the will of political 
agendas, Chinese banks have not accumulated sufficient experience in 
commercial banking.  Credit policy standards continue to be lax, and 
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personnel lack appropriate credit training (Lardy, 1998).  Civilian borrowing 
has increased dramatically in the past decade, surpassing in growth rate of 
enterprise borrowing (“Borrowing accelerates,” 2003).  The Chinese central 
bank has tried to address such issues by limiting simultaneous borrowing, and 
greater financial disclosure of borrowers.  However, the central bank is 
limited in regulatory and supervisory abilities and thus can not offer strong 
leadership position to transition China’s current state to a commercial banking 
system.   
China has only just initiated the institutional transformation that is 
required to allocate capital more efficiently.  The creations of new 
commercially-oriented banks are better equipped to meet the needs of a 
modern economy.  However, the state has under-capitalized these new 
financial institutions by insulating state banks against competition, and 
consequently diminishing new commercial banks’ catalytic role in reforming 
China’s financial structure.  The pervasive problem of new commercial banks 
is the lack of controls on lending policies.  During the reform era, banks 
loaned randomly to enterprises; in the past decade, financial institutions have 
moved to lending indiscriminately to individual consumers.  Lending to state 
sectors enterprises has decreased in proportion over the years, largely due to 
the decreased number, and has freed up banks to transfer capital investments 
in more private enterprises (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002b).   
 The reforms of the late 1990s contributed to an increased pace of 
restructuring, constituting an important break in the conservative philosophies 
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of the 1980s.  Inefficiently and misallocated funding of state-managed 
enterprises, high market demand, and consumer optimism contributed to the 
difficulty of choosing profitable companies.  However, it was an improvement 
from the 1980s, where policy of granting loans to loss-making companies for 
purchases of production equipment or other costly investment projects was in 
effect (Lardy, 1998).   
Debt un-payment consequences have been few and hard to enforce, 
and continue to be a hazard in the stability of asset to liability ratio of 
financial institutions within China.  A more defined separation of commercial 
from policy lending needs to be in place to increase independence of financial 
institutions in regards to political interference in lending decisions.   
Culture of credit loaning of banks and loan officers is still socially 
networked.  Despite absence of explicit government-directed credit, close 
relationships among banks, major industrial customers, and government exist.  
To solve the difficulty of containing imprudent lending relies on changing 
commercial behavior and not only institutional and structural reform. 
 
Intermediation 
As mentioned previously, China’s banking system lacks efficient 
intermediation.  Efficient financial systems contribute positively to economic 
growth and stabilization, especially through the allocation of funds to highest 
returning projects, increasing marginal productivity of capital, and 
maximizing usage of capital resources by continuous utilization in 
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investments.  In China, these banks are vital for two reasons.  First, the 
Chinese population for many social reasons holds confidence in the banking 
system and supplies banks with enough equity to finance debt and liability, as 
well as provide much of the investment capital needed.  Much attributed to 
this reason, China has not suffered widespread bank failures or seizure of 
savings from the state through inflation tax (Boyd, Chang, & Smith, 2004).  
Second, the variety of financial assets has grown slowly, remaining 
concentrated in cash savings (Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 
1997).  Banks, thus, have opportunities to create capital assets and credit 
cooperatives. 
With the increase of foreign involvement, Chinese banks’ role as 
intermediaries between domestic enterprises and foreign investors are 
progressively important.  Domestic banks can leverage their social networks 
and familiarity with the business environment as competitive advantages.  In 
addition, more diverse intermediation will give China’s banking system 
opportunities to gather skills and experience. 
 
Measurement and Transparency 
Overall, most commentators agree that the quality of the Chinese 
accounting and auditing framework is quite good compared to other emerging 
or transitioning countries. However, transparency and disclosure practices are 
not up to international standards.  Financial management and reporting are 
plagued with fraud and pervasive irregularities.  Particularly strong examples 
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of the scale of this problem are the recent cases of financial mismanagement 
of trust and investment companies.  In 2002, an estimated of nearly half of the 
1,500 listed Chinese companies engages in some form of accounting 
irregularities (Leggit, 2002).    
Measurement of the public sector deficit served to indicate a broad 
assessment of resources requirement of the state in its entirety of agencies and 
enterprises.  The indicators include borrowing to finance government’s budget 
deficit; specific instances are the sale of government bonds and borrowing by 
the treasury from central bank, state-owned enterprises issues of bonds and 
stocks to the public, and borrowing from the banking system (Lardy, 1998).  
Bank information disclosure is an essential part of financial transparency and 
reform.  Chinese banks are progressing gradually from "selective" information 
disclosure to substantive transparency (OECD, 2002).  A mandatory 
disclosure mechanism is being constructed with various measures to improve 
the financial strength of major banks in China.   
Compared to other transition and emerging economies, China’s 
accounting and auditing are relatively proficient, but transparency and 
disclosure practices are still behind international standards.  Accounting 
standards in China are set by the Ministry of Finance.  It’s Advisory 
Committee, including representatives of the accounting profession, academics, 
and State Audit Committee has the authorization to review draft legislation, 
though they have no role in preparing draft policies (United Nations, 1999).  
This contrasts with most advanced market economies around the world where 
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much of the accounting policies are directly attributed to the active 
accountancy industry.  Partly due to this approach, the accounting industry 
and profession, as well as the consequent implementation of the standards are 
weak.  Ministry of Finance has made clear indications of bringing the 
accounting standards up to international level, and in 1999 adopted new 
accounting standards following western examples (Chen & Yuan, 2004).  
Unlike previous accounting standards, the set of standards adopted in 1999 is 
an accounting disclosure and policy system set effectively by enterprises 
instead of the government.   
In contrast to accounting standards set by the government, audit 
standards are set by a professional organization, the Chinese Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, CICPA (Chen & Yuan, 2004).  The CICPA 
requires more independence from the state; currently it is headed by the 
deputy Finance minister, and has been weak in creating the requisite guidance 
and adopting training programs that would help lift the implementation 
standards (Chan & Rotenberg, 1999).  The big four accounting firms of the 
U.S. have audited China’s banking sector as well as a few firms that have 
been involved in international capital markets, but these foreign banks have 
not been allowed a competitive presence in the domestic corporate sector 
(Chen & Yuan, 2004).   
Non-financial disclosure, including ownership, control, and 
governance-related disclosure are also lacking, somewhat correlated with the 
advanced black market and illegitimacy of many businesses in China and Asia 
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(De Brower & Pupphavesa, 1998).  Transparency and disclosure reform still 
remains in its early stages and the concept of continuous disclosure of items 
that materially affect the business is foreign to many.  
In 2002, the Chinese government disclosed new requirements for 
improving accountancy transparency, in an effort to bring regulation of the 
banking sector up to international standards.  New regulation requires annual 
releases of financial reports, including financial statements, balance sheets and 
equity positions, including banks to have financial records audited annually by 
an accredited firm.  Regulatory provisions for online-banking were also 
established.  People’s Bank of China, PBoC, required all banks offering online 
services for the first time to file applications with PBoC prior, and must report 
quarterly its business details (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002a).   
Although recent disclosure of negative information has not had 
significant influence on public confidence, foreign investment 
and bank management, the necessity of enhanced disclosure 
and its increasing importance in the long run is substantive 
(Chen, 2003).  
 
Strategies to Improve Domestic Banking 
 Central government, supervisory officials, and banks, have made 
strong efforts to correct weaknesses of domestic banks.  Over the last several 
years, state-owned central banks have closed smaller outlying branches and 
transferring their business to larger city branches and headquarters; between 
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1997 and 2000, nearly 21,000 offices were closed (OECD, 2002).  Large 
efforts on cutting surplus staff and maximizing productivity have been 
implemented, mostly by investing extensively in equipment and other 
facilities to modernize and improve efficiency of bank operations (World 
Bank, 2000).  In addition to cost cutting, China banks’ business strategies 
have focused on two objectives; improving credit quality, and diversifying 
and strengthening products in areas of greatest comparative advantage 
(Yeung, 2004).  Strong encouragement from supervisory authorities gave 
banks empowerment; banks have tightened internal controls on lending, 
upgraded internal accounting and information technology systems.  These 
changes are critical because of rapid shift of China’s enterprises in response to 
trade and investment liberalization.  Effective and forward-looking credit 
assessment capabilities for China’s banks must be improved.   
China’s domestic commercial banks possess important competitive 
advantages in raising deposits, servicing customers, and having close relations 
and knowledge of their clientele.  Close ties with the government, primarily in 
their role in financing state-owned enterprises and government infrastructure 
projects present advantages of increased capability as a result of extensive 
opening of the economy to international markets and protection from entry of 
foreign-invested enterprises.    Cash management, foreign exchange, and other 
services for commercial customers should develop further so as to improve 
profitability and enhance banks’ ability to retain most profitable enterprise 
clients.  One of the largest areas for growth is the exponential expansion for 
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housing and home ownership, automobile purchases, and other consumer 
durables.  Issues with profitability may be appeased by tapping into this area 
of growth. 
To strengthen competitiveness, domestic banks should exploit their 
key advantages of the close relationships and knowledge about domestic 
enterprises and households.  Special efforts should be made to form alliances 
among domestic banks or with foreign banks to exploit their complementary 
advantages, which Chinese banks seem to be already taking the initiative, as 
can be seen from recent partnering.  Bringing in a foreign partner who can 
introduce better risk management and other systems and practices which it 
would otherwise take years to develop and master can produce almost instant 
benefits (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005).  In order to stimulate the 
transformation of domestic banking system, China should continue to utilize 
the role of foreign financial institutions, and eliminate their limitations in 
domestic financial system.   
 
Conclusions 
A central part of China's success has been its gradualist stance toward 
economic and political reform. In contrast with Russia's unsuccessful shock 
therapy, China managed to liberalize slowly without losing control of the legal 
system and the political process. The often-condemned suppression of the 
Tiananmen Square student uprising in 1989 was a crucial part of this 
approach.  Had the government yielded to the student protests, the likely result 
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would have been political chaos and poorer economic performance (Barro, 
2003). 
China’s financial system has made important progress in recent years.  
The stock market has expanded impressively since its inception in the early 
1990s, reaching a market capitalization of more the 50 per cent of GDP by 
2001 (OECD, 2002).  In 2004, China’s stock market has developed into 
Asia’s third biggest with more than 1,300 companies 4 trillion Renminbi of 
market capitalization and more than 70 million stock traders (“Sustainable 
growth needed for China’s stock market,” 2004). The financial supervisory 
and regulatory structure have also been thoroughly reorganized and 
rationalized along lines consistent with international best practices. 
Despite progress, the financial system still has inadequacies in 
carrying out several basic functions in the economy.  Savings mobilization has 
been relatively effective, but credit lacks proper allocation practices.  State-
owned enterprises still receive bulk of the funds allocated by the formal 
financial system, while non-state enterprises receive much lower share than is 
warranted by their importance in the overall economy.  The need to sustain 
loss-making state-owned enterprises continues to influence bank lending; 
largely by the limited ability to vary interest rates to reflect risk, implying that 
cost of credit varies widely among borrowers of comparable credit worthiness.   
Habit of government-mandated lending and weak contract 
enforcement and bankruptcy regimes has created a distorted credit culture, 
which banks have limited incentives and ability to maintain strict lending 
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standards and enforce loan contracts.  The weakness of discipline has been 
aggravated by excess and inefficient investment behavior of many enterprises, 
which has been inherited by the modern Chinese economy.   
The government continues to struggle in sustaining adequate job 
growth for millions of workers laid off from state-owned enterprises, 
migrants, and new entrants to the work force; reducing corruption and other 
economic crimes; and keeping afloat the large state-owned enterprises, many 
of which had been shielded from competition by subsidies and had been 
losing the ability to pay full wages and pensions (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2005).   
Critical concerns that China’s financial infrastructure will not support 
rapid growth and consumption of the 21st century have put considerable 
attention in decreasing the economic growth.  Government’s careful 
application of fiscal policy to restrain temporary exponential growth has been 
successful.  Fixed asset investments have decelerated to 26 percent growth, as 
compared to 50 percent the previous year (Chipman, 2005).  Accompanying 
these early signs of success have also generated a renewed sense of 
confidence in the Chinese government and its commitment to dealing with 
important economic issues and to building multi-lateral, open-business 
relationships in the worldwide community (Chipman, 2005).  However, 
temporary successes may not be enough to impede the pursuant problems with 
rising unemployment, deflation from overinvestment in manufacturing 
capacity, a banking system struggling with non-performing loans, and a 
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growing deficit caused by government efforts to keep real GDP at the range of 
seven to eight percent (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002b).   
These weaknesses in the financial system are partly a reflection of the 
fact that China is still a developing country.  It also reflects the fact that 
evolution of the financial system has lagged behind real economic progress.  
China’s transition to a market economy needs the creation of a modern 
banking system, one that will meet accepted international accounting 
standards.  The implementation of a hybrid modern commercial banking 
system in China reflects the understanding by Chinese leaders of the 
underlying structural problems in the banking system.  After China’s 
accession into the WTO, the central government remains committed to 
meeting obligations with the biggest obstacles being enforcement mechanisms 
at the local level (“China and the WTO: perspective on a changing 
environment,” 2005).  Accession to the World Trade Organization helps 
stabilize, if not strengthen, China’s ability to maintain growth rates but puts 
additional pressure on the hybrid system of political controls and growing 
market influences.  
Being the country that supplies the largest labor force and consuming 
population, and having an economy increasingly exposed to market forces, 
China has large effects on the current world market.  The complexity of 
certain factors of China’s economic system require an identification of 
political, social, and economic structures and practices, as well as the 
inefficiencies that may produce problematic imbalances in China’s economy.  
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Capital resources and structures, being the groundwork for economic 
development, has been particularly important in that inefficiencies regarding 
how capital is processed and allocated are now more obvious.  In association, 
the hybrid system of a large government enterprise sector transitioning into a 
market economy, in which China has successfully built its reputation, has 
shown the importance of managing state enterprises.  China’s hybrid 
capitalistic progress has given credibility to a different form of capitalistic 
development.  China now needs to establish the basic institutional and 
regulatory reforms to meet international requirements.   
Though findings have largely revealed cyclic problems in which 
certain areas interact in mutually reinforcing ways to impede progress, 
particularly involving weaknesses of the state-owned enterprises and banking 
system, there is also a less prominent issue of business mentality in China.  
There exists a strong underlying cultural ideology that makes true separation 
of policy and commercial still remote.  Though there are institutional and 
structural reform that may speed China’s transformation, detaching 
fundamental social-political-economic aspect of Chinese business behavior 
require decades if not a half a century of shifting from social norms and 
communication networks of traditional Chinese business culture to that of 
market capitalism.  It is precisely this reliance on personal networking and 
close interrelation between distinct areas that makes China a unique specimen 
in capitalistic reform.  It is important to identify and understand the structural 
and institutional inefficiencies of China’s growing economy, but in order to 
         INEFFICIENCIES OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM  48   
  
 
reduce China’s long-term growth uncertainties, additional concentration needs 
to be put on the socio-economic factors.  Before expanding on the advanced 
institutional and regulatory reforms to the likes of western economies, China’s 
next step is to implement socially reformative initiatives to change the 
behavior of its consuming public, highly personalized-business-dealing 
commercial class, and commercially-affiliated politicians.  Those that propose 
direct transition in reforming China’s economic and capital development to 
that equivalent of western examples will need to acknowledge the existence 
and influences of these underlying cultural factors on China’s economic 
progress as well as its more obvious structural inefficiencies.  China’s current 
approach should be to reform structures and institutions to meet international 
standards and reduce major internal inefficiencies, predominately in its 
policies toward state-owned enterprises and the banking system.  However, 
China, being uniquely differentiated by its culture, history, and people, may 
develop its own capitalistic regime without following the exact steps of other 
established economies.  
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